Abstract: Competition law and regulation had played a prominent role in theprocess of construction and liberalization of the internal energy market in the EU. Several transactions in the last decade have shown the difficulties of the process and how Member States may occasionally make a political use of merger review rules and of regulation to benefit domestic firms. This chapter describes in all its complexity the ENDESA takeover contest (2005)(2006)(2007). This case is a unique example of the mixture of legal issues that may be involved in takeovers requiring competition and regulatory approval. Several lessons can be learnt from the case, not only for the history of Spanish and European competition law (especially regarding merger review). Other relevant industrial policy, regulation and corporate law issues were also raised by this landmark case, though the case is mainly illustrative of how politics, at the end, may affect or shape the final outcome in some business transactions.
INTRODUCTION
Electricity and gas are network industries with several specific features (natural monopoly, public goods) that make them prone to market failure 1 Several regulatory measures have been adopted in the EU to liberalize gas and electricity markets. Other measures have been adopted to promote an internal energy market across the EU, but insufficient cross-border interconnections among national networks make competition between companies from different Member States limited . They are also services of general economic interest subject to public service obligations. In the past in the EU there has been little room for competition in these sectors: they were monopolized by publicly owned firms, often vertically integrated, which covered the whole or parts of Member States and which were largely isolated from each other. 2 On the other hand, given the public interest in securing the supply of energy, these sectors are subject to intense State regulation and control. Moreover, there is always a strong political ingredient in government's rules and decisions in energy issues . 3 1 Physical characteristics of energy commodities, mainly electricity (which is non-storable) heavily influence supply flows and condition market functioning (competition, contracts and pricing).
. Demand for energy is highly 2 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Report on progress in creating the internal gas and electricity market, 11.032009, 7-9 (disparities in electricity and gas prices for household consumers in the Member States are a sign of insufficient market integration).
BACKGROUND
In 1944, in the aftermath of the Civil War, the Spanish government created ENDESA (EMPRESA NACIONAL DE ELECTRICIDAD, S.A.) as a state-owned firm aimed at controlling the electricity sector, considered to be strategic and of national interest. Over the next decades, ENDESA grew as the largest energy utility company in Spain. As years went by, it took over several other domestic electricity firms (in 1983 ENHER, GESA, UNELCO, ENCASUR and ERZ; from 1991 onwards, ELECTRA DE VIESGO, FECSA, SEVILLANA DE ELECTRICIDAD, SALTOS DEL NANS and HECSA). Later ENDESA expanded internationally mainly into Italy, France, Portugal, Poland and some Latin American countries (Chile, Argentina, Colombia, Peru and Brazil), using for that purpose some of the proceeds it obtained from its progressive privatization in the 1980s and 1990s 10 ENDESA is active both at the wholesale and retail level in the Spanish electricity market. It is one of the main generators, distributors and sellers of electricity in Spain, with market shares well above of 30% in each of the submarkets in the electricity industry. In the last few years it has followed a business diversification strategy, including additional electricity sources in its portfolio (including renewable energy and co-generation), with a small presence also in natural gas distribution. It is the largest electricity generator in Spain. As it was indicated before, it also vertically integrates electricity supply. ENDESA has ownership interest in six of . 10 In 1988, the Spanish Government (rectius the INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE INDUSTRIA, INI, through which most State owned industry holdings were held at that time) floated 20,4% of ENDESA's share capital in NYSE. The State's ownership holding was later reduced to 66,9% in 1994. Another 25% was sold in 1997 and all the rest of the State holdings in the company were sold in 1998. For a description of the overall privatization of Spanish SOEs in which the sale of ENDESA took place see M.A. Ortega-Almón & M. A. Sánchez Domínguez, 'The Privatization Process in Spain (1985 Spain ( -2001 ', (2001) Teoria Evidencia Economica, Passo Fundo, 9/17, 9-24. the eight nuclear power plants active in Spain, although the electricity power generated comes mainly from thermal plants powered by carbon, combined-cycle gas turbine power plants, hydroelectric power stations and renewable sources. In the last decade, combined-cycle gas turbine power plants (CCGT or CCPP) have greatly increased their importance as a crucial source of electricity, amounting to more than a third of total Spanish electricity production 11 Apart from ENDESA, other traditional players in the highly concentrated Spanish electricity markets are IBERDROLA, UNION FENOSA and HIDROCANTÁBRICO. Electricity and gas industries were liberalized in the 1990s . 12 , but the regulatory reform did not necessarily increase competition in the market 13 . Several transactions have ignited the market since 2000, notably the battle for the control of ENDESA in 2007. Before that, there was a merger attempt between ENDESA and IBERDROLA, which was authorized by the Government in 2001 but which never was completed due to the harsh conditions the Government imposed on competition grounds (together the two companies represented 80% of the electricity generation capacity in Spain) 14 11 Therefore, gas can be cheaply and efficiently used as a source of electricity. On this strategy (which was a very relevant issue in the GAS NATURAL bid for ENDESA) and the impact it may have on competition in the markets in Spain, see J. López Milla, 'La integración vertical de los negocios de gas y electricidad posibles efectos sobre la competencia en los mercados afectados', (2007) Economía industrial, 364, 125-137. Indeed, in the last few years the vast majority of M&A in the EU energy industry involve both gas and electricity companies, see S. 
economic enterprises permeates the carácter of the liberalization legislation and has influenced some of the outcomes in terms of corporate ownership and control")
. 13 An explanation of regulatory pitfalls and state provoked distortions (e.g., national coal policy) derailing regulatory reforms, see Arocena, Kühn & Regibeau, (1999) Energy Policy, 27/7, 387-399. See also Garrués-Irurzun, J., 'Market power versus regulatory power in the Spanish electricity system, 1973-1996', (2010) 2003, as it considered that the financing (debt) of the transaction would carry significant risks for the investment plans of the company in the regulated activities of gas and electricity transport and distribution (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) 
THE BEGINNING OF THE BATTLE: GAS NATURAL BID.
On September 5 th 2005, GAS NATURAL announced the launch of a tender offer for all the shares of ENDESA. It offered €21.30 per share, part in cash (€7.34 per share) and part in GAS NATURAL shares (2 shares of GAS NATURAL in exchange for one share of ENDESA)
22
22 As ENDESA's statutes limit the votes of any single shareholder to 10% and conditions were required to join the Board of Directors, GAS NATURAL conditioned its bid on reaching 75% of the share capital and changing these rules (such an amendment requires the approval of more than 50% of shareholders).
. GAS NATURAL was valuing ENDESA at €22,551 million and it expected to close the deal by the end of April 2006. Prior to that, GAS NATURAL would have increased its share capital by issuing the shares that would be required for the exchange bid for ENDESA. The offer caught ENDESA's management by surprise, but on September 6 th 2005 the bid was rejected outright by ENDESA's board: it was considered grossly inadequate and not in the best interest of its shareholders. The Board unanimously considered that the implied value of the offer was inferior and uncertain, when compared with ENDESA's stand alone strategic plan 23 GAS NATURAL is a relatively small energy group of energy undertakings, operating mainly in the supply, distribution and marketing of natural gas in Spain, Italy and Latin America. It was formed in 1991 by a three-way merger of CATALANA DE GAS, MADRID GAS and the piped gas assets of REPSOL. GAS NATURAL is the leader in the market for gas in Spain (largest gas supplier in Spanish market and main gas distributor). It is also a new entrant in the electricity sector in which it is also active in the generation and supply of electricity. Although it is a newcomer in electricity, it has a big growth potential, both in generation (because of its CCGT plants) and retail supply (experience and large commercial network in the gas market). According to GAS NATURAL, the acquisition would allow the creation of a Gas/Electricity "national champion" in Spain, combining its strengths in gas markets with those of ENDESA's in the electricity market, in order to build a global energy dual-fuel operator. It would become the first energy company in Spain and Latin America (both in gas and electricity), and the third largest utility company worldwide with more than 31 million customers. The estimated cost savings were of 350 million € per year with additional potential savings from increased efficiencies of 75 million € per year .
24
GAS NATURAL is based in Barcelona. It has been suggested that the offer was triggered by regional political interests. Apparently, the political parties in charge of Catalonia's government at that time had signed an agreement to encourage the creation of Catalonian operators in key strategic sectors, including energy .
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GAS NATURAL is controlled by LA CAIXA, a local savings bank, strongly linked to the regional government and local interests. The political support by the Spanish socialist government was coupled with the support of Catalonia's government, as the idea of the Spanish energy national champion being based in Catalonia was cherished by the regional government. The . Moreoever, the Socialist government in Madrid favoured the deal considering it as a means for creating a national champion to compete in the global energy market, whilst the deal was opposed by the center-right opposition Popular Party (PP). Furthermore, the largest shareholder of ENDESA at that time was CAJA MADRID (10%), a large savings bank based in Madrid whose Board was dominated by people appointed by the regional government of Madrid, which was ruled by the PP.
GAS NATURAL takeover attempt became a political battle with several parliamentary appearances dealing with the government's intervention in the process. Apart from the central government, some of the Spanish regions (mainly, but not only, Catalonia's government 26 Aside from the political implications of the case, the Board of Directors of ENDESA vowed to defend the company's independence and it took various steps aimed at derailing GAS NATURAL's offer. ENDESA's board opposed the bid on several legal grounds, from competition law and regulation to corporate law ) and the Spanish Government took sides in the transaction at different stages and were crucial in the final outcome. 27 .
Competition Law issues.
GAS NATURAL was required to notify the transaction to the competition authorities and to the energy regulator. In anticipation of possible competition concerns that would probably be raised by the authorities, it proposed an initial sale of some assets to IBERDROLA. IBERDROLA is ENDESA's main rival in the generation, distribution and sale of electricity in Spain (with even larger shares than ENDESA in the electricity's sale market), and it is also significantly involved in the natural gas market.
On the competition side, the initial bid by GAS NATURAL raised several interesting issues that are worth looking at. Overall, they demonstrate the success of ENDESA's strategy of delaying the potential acquisition by GAS NATURAL . First, ENDESA argued that the transaction had a community dimension and, therefore, the European Commission was competent to review the merger (infra §2.1.1). The Commission's jurisdiction over the case was also requested, unsuccessfully, by the Italian and Portuguese national competition authorities (infra §2.1.2). 27 In terms of resistance, ENDESA carried out a severe defence that, at the end, effectively blocked GAS NATURAL's bid; for a description of takeover defences (some of them, mainly post-offer and principally litigation were used by ENDESA) and a review of the literature on the issue, see R. S. Ruback, 'An Overview of Takeover Defenses', in A. J. Auerbach, ed., Mergers and Acquisitions, U. of Chicago Press 1987, 49-67. 28 In the words of the Judicial Decree of the Madrid Provincial Court nº 28 of 15.01.2007 (proc. 523/2005) "ENDESA has tried to use its entire arsenal against the operation launched by Gas Natural, also raising claims before the Commercial Courts, but not all the weapons that may be wielded must be suitable for combat"(Legal Ground 6 th ). GAS NATURAL'S assessment was obviously also very negative characterizing ENDESA's strategy as a systematic obstruction, "tooth and nail", independently of its rationale, its aim being only to obtain injunctions to stop the transaction, see GAS NATURAL reaction to the Judicial Decree of Commercial Court nº 8 of Madrid of 21.03.2006, filed the same day before the SSEC (Relevant Fact OC 20258).
At the same time, ENDESA managed to obtain an injunction to stop the offer from proceeding as it convinced a commercial court that the transaction was part of an anticompetitive conspiracy to eliminate ENDESA from the market (i.e., a buy and divide collusive agreement) (infra §2.1.3). Finally, within the domestic merger review system, the Spanish Government authorized the transaction [despite a negative opinion by the Spanish Defense Competition Tribunal (infra §2.1.4)], although ENDESA again managed to provisionally suspend this decision by challenging it before the Spanish Supreme Court (infra § 2.1.5). Several years later, it was also the two-thirds rule which prevented the European Commission from analysing the acquisition of UNIÓN FENOSA by GAS NATURAL 38 . Both companies were vertically integrated groups active in gas/electricity markets in Spain and elsewhere, and the transaction was cleared by the Spanish National Competition Commission (NCC), subject to commitments, on February 11 th 2009 (because of the risks the transaction posed for the maintenance of effective competition in some of the markets affected, especially in the supply of gas to Spain, the wholesale electricity market and retail supply of gas and electricity) 39 .
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Upward Referral to the European Commission from Portuguese and Italian Competition Authorities?
On the other hand, even if the transaction was not subject to the EMR, it was to be notified in several EU jurisdictions where the concerned undertakings conducted business. That was the case in relation to Portugal and Italy, where GAS NATURAL filed notifications before the respective national competition authorities.
Both the Portuguese Autoridade da Concorrência and the Italian Autorità Garante della
Concorrenza requested the European Commission to take the case in accordance with article contested by ENDESA, the General Court finally deciding the issue by order of 12.12.2008 (T-417/05 DEP), which set the amount to be paid at 66,887.70€. 38 This very same rule prevented the European Commission from deciding on other cases with huge implications throughout the EU and specially in the process of consolidation of the internal energy market, for example the case E.ON/RUHRGAS ( concerning the main electricity operator and the main gas operator and importer in Germany). In that case, in accordance with §42 GWB, the German Minister for Economic Affairs authorized a concentration that was disapproved by the Bundeskartellamt (4000-U-109/01, of 21 January 2002, EON/Ruhrgas) based on an overriding public interest (a national champion would be created that would improve national supply security and increase competitiveness in international energy markets), although the transaction was not supported by the Monopolkomission. See OECD, Germany-Regulatory Reform in Electricity, Gas, and Pharmacies, 2004, 70-71. 39 C-0098/08 (GAS NATURAL/UNIÓN FENOSA). The remedies imposed were mainly divestitures to favour entry of new operators in the gas market or strengthen existing ones, counteracting the disappearance of UNIÓN FENOSA as a competitor and lowering the entry barriers to the acquirer of the divested assets. See G. The authorization by the Spanish NCC was challenged in court by ENI, SPA on several grounds, including that the transaction should have been analyzed by the European Commission because it constituted an indirect acquisition of the joint-venture UNION FENOSA GAS that ENI had with UNION FENOSA and if ENI turnover was taken into account, the two-thirds exemption would not apply. The Spanish National Court rejected this argument on the basis that there had occurred only a mere change in the controlling shareholder of one of the companies exercising joint control ( 14 22(3) of the EMR, but the Commission refused to accept the referral requests 40 . It did so on the basis of the wide discretion provided by the rules governing referrals and because it was not shown neither that the transaction would have had a major impact on trade among Member States (with the risk of appreciably affecting competition in those jurisdictions) nor that the Commission was better suited than the Portuguese or the Italian Competition authorities to assess the impact of the transaction in those jurisdictions 41 Ultimately, although the Commission probably thought that it should be the competent authority to review the transaction . 42 , the fact that the Spanish Competition authorities were not keen to hand over the transaction, supported the Commission rejection of the Portuguese and Italian upward referral requests 43 .
The Pre-merger disposal agreement: Up-front buyer proposal as an anticompetitive agreement?
Business acquisitions that may lead to excessive market concentration are frequently backed up with divestment deals that seek to alleviate potential competition concerns that could be raised by the authorities. Anticipatory remedies proposals try to preserve competition, by maintaining the number of competitors in markets affected and avoiding increases in market shares in overlapping markets. In this case there was a pre-sale agreement between GAS NATURAL and IBERDROLA. According to that agreement IBERDROLA agreed to buy assets in electricity generation in Spain and Latin America, and electricity and gas distribution for an estimated value of €7,000-8,000 million . 41 
See IP/05/1356: Commission declines Portuguese and Italian requests to consider effects of proposed Gas
Natural/Endesa merger on their markets, 27.10.2005. 42 The power of the European Commission to intervene in merger cases being assessed by national competition authorities if there is a significant effect on trade could be recognized, analogous to the one provided by article 11 (6) 44 See presentation "Acuerdo Gas Natural-Iberdrola" (trans. "Agreement Gas Natural-Iberdrola") filed by GAS NATURAL before the SSEC on 16.09.2005 (Relevant Fact OC19169). According to GAS NATURAL, the choice of IBERDROLA was justified by its strong technical and economic capabilities to exploit the divested assets in a more efficient and competitive way. The acquisition of the divested assets by IBERDROLA would be deemed as an independent transaction that might itself have triggered merger review proceedings. Indeed, the fact that the acquirer was the second largest electricity company in Spain was another fact likely to jeopardize a smooth
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In this case, the pre-sale agreement lead to an unforeseen development when on November 25 th , 2005, ENDESA filed a claim against GAS NATURAL and IBERDROLA in a Madrid commercial court alleging their agreement amounted to an anti-competitive conspiracy to eliminate a rival 45 . According to ENDESA, two of its competitors (GAS NATURAL and IBERDROLA) were part of a concerted practice to buy and fragment a rival, in violation of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) 46 ENDESA requested the court to issue interim measures, to suspend the takeover bid and the subsequent agreement with IBERDROLA. Surprisingly, the commercial court found some basis for ENDESA's claim, and it suspended GAS NATURAL bid for some months, requesting a €1,000 million bond .
. Only ten months later the Madrid Provincial Court of Appeals found
ENDESA's claim unfounded and discharged its claim 48 . According to the Provincial Court it made no sense at all to consider that the sale agreement related to the takeover was an anticompetitive agreement in breach of article 101 of TFEU, mainly because it was conditioned the success of the takeover bid by GAS NATURAL and could not be understood unless tied to it, and also because it was made public to the authorities (something that normally does not happen with violations of article 101 of TFEU) and, thus, they would be able to correct any possible anticompetitive concerns it may inflict.
Decision under the Spanish domestic merger review system.
After the request of the Spanish Competition Defense Service 49 transaction. See Federico, (2011) Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 7/3, 617. , the analysis of the GAS NATURAL bid entered into the second phase of the merger review proceedings on November 7 th , 2005. This gave the national competition authorities extra-time (2 months) to examine the transaction, which it is only done in those cases in which the transaction raises concerns that it will potentially reduce effective competition in the market (article 15bis of 1989 Spanish 45 This provoked a conflict between ENDESA and IBERDROLA, which had a very negative impact in the functioning and works of the association of Spanish electricity operators (UNESA) to which both companies belonged. For several months UNESA experienced a deadlock in its operations due to this conflict between its two main members.
46 OJ 2000 OJ C 83, 30.3.2010 According to the final decision of the CDT, the takeover would give birth to the market leader in several segments of the gas and electricity markets in Spain. Given the substantial entry barriers in these markets and the vertical integration of the firms involved (which would have been considerably strengthened by the transaction), the takeover raised significant and severe anti-competitive concerns in the market for technical restrictions and in the markets for the supply of gas and electricity in some parts of the country (Catalonia and Andalucía). Above all, the transaction would reduce the existing asymmetry in gas and electricity between GAS NATURAL and ENDESA, creating a conglomerate operator integrating both gas and electricity with substantial market power, that might lead to an increase in prices paid for gas and electricity. Apart from these unilateral effects, there would be an increased risk of . The decision was adopted following a vote in which the CDT was split according to party lines (the six appointed by PP voting against the authorization, the three appointed by Socialist Party voting in favor of the authorization, and providing a dissenting opinion). In exchange GAS NATURAL asked other academics to write a report in response (The Proposed Acquisition of Endesa by Gas Natural: Is There an Academic Consensus Against Electricity and Gas Mergers, Nov. 5, 2005) , which was also published, see A. J. Padilla, M. Polo, M. Schnitzer, D. Spector, R. Schmalensee & X. Vives, 'The Proposed Acquisition of Endesa by Gas Natural: Is There an Academic Consensus Against Electricity and Gas Mergers', (2004) Utilities Law Review, 14/6, 268-274. coordination with the other main players in the concentrated Spanish energy markets. The CDT also considered that GAS NATURAL alleged efficiencies of €430 million were not enough to compensate for the negative competitive effects of the transaction. Moreover, it considered that the divestments proposed by GAS NATURAL would not solve the horizontal, vertical and conglomerate negative effects of the transaction on competition.
Nonetheles, despite the negative opinion of the CDT, and given the Government was empowered to take a different decision 53 , it gave its authorization for the transaction to proceed on February 3 rd , 2006, although it imposed substantial remedies affecting electricity generation, gas transport and gas and electricity supply 54
On the other hand, ENDESA was very active in trying to use competition law not only to defend itself against the hostile takeover bid but also to attack the hostile bidder. ENDESA's attack also reached LA CAIXA, GAS NATURAL's principal shareholder. ENDESA filed a claim before the competition authorities on December 1 st 2005 accusing LA CAIXA of breaching Spanish merger review rules. The argument was that LA CAIXA had in the past joint control of GAS NATURAL with REPSOL (together they held more than 60% of its share capital), but some changes in the participation of LA CAIXA in REPSOL (which according to ENDESA had became solely controlled by LA CAIXA), gave LA CAIXA sole control of GAS NATURAL without those . In electricity generation, the remedies imposed were the mandatory sale of 4,300 megawatts of capacity and a prohibition on the purchase of any CCGP plants for 2 years. Moreover, existing power customers (CCGP) were granted the right to cancel contracts without penalty. In relation to gas supply, an obligation was introduced to ensure a stable supply source of gas to GAS NATURAL's competitors through auctions. Remedies also required the release of 1,8 bcm per year of gas for three years from 2007 by releasing excess gas from Sagane 1 contract with Algeria (to be done through public tenders from December 2006) and the mandatory sale of ENDESA's stakes in Saggas and Reganosa regasification plants and the reduction of its stake in ENAGAS from 15% to 1%. Finally, in the area of gas distribution, another remedy required the sale of distribution facilities and tariff supply agreements with at least 1,500,000 supply outlets to create no less than two new competitors of a minimum size of 250,000 supply outlets. changes having been notified to the competition authorities.However, it is not reported that the Spanish competition authorities adopted any decision on this claim 55 .
Injunction against the Government's decision.
Once the authorization of the transaction by the Government was effective, at the beginning of February 2006, the SSEC would allow the offer to proceed in the stock markets (although the injunction referred supra §2.1.3 was still in place) and the conditions would have to be fulfilled. However, various conditions required major sales and divestments by GAS NATURAL, so ENDESA, one consumers' association (Euroconsumo) and an association of minority shareholders challenged the Government's authorization before the Supreme Court and requested interim measures for the acquisition to be blocked. They argued that if the government authorization was effective and the offer was allowed to proceed and was successful, not only would competition in the affected markets be lessened but the execution of the divestment remedies by the acquirer would also be difficult to reverse in the event that the challenge to the government authorization was successful.
In a highly discussed decision (vote split 18-14, two separate dissenting opinions were issued), the Supreme Court agreed to grant the precautionary measures at the end of April 2006, but required ENDESA to post a €1,000 million bond 56 . The majority opinion of the Supreme Court was based on various reports which confirmed the anticipated negative and pernicious competitive effects of the transaction in both gas and electricity markets 57
The injunction against the government authorization of GAS NATURAL's offer was lifted by the Supreme Court on January 2007, after ENDESA and the rest of the applicants asked for it to be revoked given that the circumstances had substantially changed . 58 . At that time, keeping the injunction in place prevented competitive takeover bids made being effective. It was true that the new circumstances made the continuation of the precautionary injunction unnecessary as, for instance, there was a competing offer by EON (already authorized by the government) and other transactions were taking place in the stock market that made the acquisition by GAS NATURAL unlikely to succeed (see infra §3). 2007; 29.05.2007; 12.07.2007, 24.10.2007 and 27.10.2007 , the case was closed as it was devoid of purpose or interest once GAS NATURAL withdrew its bid on February 1 st 2007.
Energy Regulation issues.
On the energy regulation front, because ENDESA's activities are subject to specific energy regulation and to control by the National Energy Commission (NEC), GAS NATURAL requested authorization. The NEC authorized the bid, subject to the fulfillment of several conditions aimed at preserving the solvency of regulated firms affected by the transaction, among them the sale of assets valued at €8,200 million and the maintenance of a net financial debt/EBIDTA ratio of less than 5.25% during three years, limitations on dividend distributions, and maintaining pre-existing investment plans of both GAS NATURAL and ENDESA
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ENDESA unsuccessfully challenged NCE's authorization before the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Commerce. Besides. the National Court rejected ENDESA's claim for suspension of NEC's authorization on July 20 th 2006.
.
Corporate Law and Securities Regulation issues.
ENDESA was also very active in fighting the GAS NATURAL bid in the corporate and securities regulation fronts. On November 30 th 2005, ENDESA claimed before the Spanish SSEC that GAS NATURAL main shareholder -LA CAIXA-was effectively controlling GAS NATURAL and that it was required by Spanish takeover laws to launch a takeover bid for all the shares of GAS NATURAL.
The most controversial issue here was the passivity duty that Spanish takeover laws impose on the board of directors of the companies target in tender offers, according to the rules in force at that time . The NEC's opinion was less negative than the one delivered by the CDT, as it held that the transaction could be allowed to proceed if the authorization was subject to some remedies being adopted (similar -though more strict-to those finally imposed by the Government). Moreover, ENDESA accused GAS NATURAL, IBERDROLA and the banking guarantors (UBS, SOCIETÉ GENERALE and LA CAIXA) of violating the prohibition on financial assistance. According to ENDESA, the offer was to be financed by the proceeds from a sale of assets to IBERDROLA valued €7,000-8,000 million and that contravened the prohibition of any kind of loan, guarantee or financial assistance by a company to acquire its own shares . 63 . Both the commercial court and the provincial court rejected ENDESA's claims on this issue, arguing that the sale of assets was not aimed at providing financial assistance for the acquisition but to offer a solution to the harmful competition effects that the transaction may have and that ENDESA's assets were neither used to finance the share acquisition 64 Finally, as ENDESA is also listed in the NYSE, a takeover bid had to be launched for ENDESA's American Depositary Shares (ADS), and the transaction had to be approved also by the U.S.
any kind or instruments and other securities giving right to subscribe or acquire them, other than when executing previous issuance agreements, authorized by the shareholder's meeting. b) Transact directly or indirectly with securities affected by the offer with the purpose of disturbing its purpose. c) Proceed to the disposition, lease, mortgage or encumbrance of property or other corporate assets when it may disturb or defeat the tender offer. 2. Those limitations also apply to the companies of the group to which the target company belongs and any others that may act together in agreement with the target company".
61 By Order of 13.02.2006, the Commercial Court of Barcelona nº 1 rejected to suspend both the dividend distribution proposal and the advertising campaign initiated by ENDESA. 
A WHITE KNIGHT COMES ON STAGE: EON ENTERS THE BATTLE.
On February 27 th , 2006, the Spanish SEC approved GAS NATURAL'S tender bid. It was formally rejected by ENDESA's board on March 6th. On that date the 45-day acceptance period by ENDESA's shareholders was opened, but it lapsed on March 21 st when a Commercial Court granted interim measures and the tender was suspended (see supra § 2.1.3).
Although only some of ENDESA's individual legal challenges against GAS NATURAL's bid were successful, overall it managed to delay the effectiveness of the original bid long enough for competing bidders to enter the market. Undoubtedly, the best way to thwart GAS NATURAL's hostile bid was to drive up ENDESA's price by igniting a contest for its control. For that reason, there were insisting rumors that ENDESA's executives were seeking an alternative bidder to fight GAS NATURAL offer. E.ON was a major player in the global energy market, being the world's largest fully-private energy firm (with annual revenues exceeding €55,000 million) and the second electricity provider in the world. E.ON was the largest German energy group resulting from the merger in 2000 of VEBA and VIAG . The offer amounted to €29,100 million, which would be financed through a combination of debt and existing resources. . The offer for ENDESA made sense to E.ON for several reasons: enlarging its scale of operations (especially in South America, but also in France and Italy), diversifying them and preparing for the opening of the European power market, and it would 66 GAS NATURAL filed a claim before the SSEC against ENDESA for providing privileged information to E.ON's executives on March 4 th 2012. It also challenged the relationship between E.ON, ENDESA and DEUTSCHE BANK (which acquired a substantial amount of shares of ENDESA at that time) as an act of unfair competition consisting of providing privileged access to a rival in the context of a tender offer in violation of securities market regulation, leading to relevant discovery proceedings by the Commercial Court of Barcelona nº 1, of 25.10. 2006. 67 The final price to be paid would be reduced by €2.095 per share (to €25,405) in case ENDESA paid the announced €2.40 dividend. Initially, E.ON though its offer would not face regulatory or competition related obstacles: there was no relevant overlap between each firm's services in their respective markets, and no concern could be posed against the transaction for leading to an anticompetitive position. . Nevertheless, it was also rejected by ENDESA's Board, though it viewed it as "not hostile" and valued positively the increase in the price and the respect for the company's project as a whole (compared with GAS NATURAL's offer).
Outwardly, E.ON 's offer was not well received by the Spanish Government, as it ran against the whole idea of building of a Spanish energy "national champion" 70 . Indeed, only three days after the bid was launched, the Spanish Government adopted some new regulations that gave additional powers to the NEC in case of the acquisition of control or a significant participation in a company operating regulated activities in Spain (for example, ENDESA) 71 . Earlier regulation had provided for control of investments made by regulated companies, but said nothing about non-regulated companies' investments in regulated firms that may affect their operations. The new regulation was soon named the "anti-E.ON Decree" as it had the immediate consequence of introducing preliminary control by the NEC of the E.ON bid that did not exist shortly before, on wider grounds to those that were considered in authorizing the GAS NATURAL bid. Of course, the European Commission was concerned and sought an explanation from the Spanish Government. The NEC decision was appealed to the Ministry of Tourism, Industry and Commerce, which on November 3th 2006 mostly confirmed the NEC's holding, authorizing E.ON's bid, but changing some of the conditions initially imposed by the NEC (brand use requirement, reduction of duration of some requirements, no divestment or sale of assets required, but additional obligation imposed to use domestic coal in power plants). After the usual steps in these cases, the European Commission concluded that the decision of the Spanish . Apart from the usual financial requirements and E.ON's obligation to respect prior ENDESA's investment commitments, among the 19 conditions imposed was the requirement for E.ON to keep the ENDESA group unchanged for a period of time, and some operation and financial requirements (service debt ratio and limitations on dividends distribution). Besides, the NEC required E.ON, irrespective of the lack of any activity in Spain at that time, to dispose of 32% of ENDESA's assets (one nuclear production facility, several coal-operated generating factories and all Spanish assets of the company located out of the Iberian Peninsula). Theoretically, these conditions were justified on public security grounds concerning national energy strategy and energy policy, mainly security of supply (related to energy generation, transport and distribution). 74 Adopted with a vote of four-to-three and two abstentions. Moreover, the decision should have been taken in one month but that it took four months to adopt it due to several NEC's requests of information to other firms recognized as interested parties (including ENDESA and GAS NATURAL) and E.ON (which in that period filed before the NEC more than 32,000 pages of documentation concerning the company and the regulatory conditions it was required to follow elsewhere and the implications of the planned merger). The European Commission declared that those measures were incompatible with EU Law and should be withdrawn. Given that the Spanish Government did not comply with the Commission request, it started infringement proceedings against the Spanish Government before the EU Court of Justice (in accordance with art. 258 of TFEU). In March 2008, the Court decided that the adoption by the Spanish Government of legal rules introducing ex ante control for transactions that led to the acquisition of a meaningful stake in the share capital of a Spanish company conducting regulated activities in the energy industry violated EU Law. It considered this to be both an unjustified restriction to freedom of movement of capital and an unjustified obstacle to freedom of establishment, without the security of supply argument providing a sound justification for the ex ante review of the transaction, which was considered disproportionate . The Commission deemed almost all the conditions to be discriminatory and restrained free movement of capital and freedom of establishment.
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After E.ON entered the contest for the control of ENDESA, additional players showed an interest in the transaction. In February 2006, the Italian energy company ENEL approached . 76 Article 21 of EUMR establishes that Member States shall not apply their national competition law to concentrations of community dimension which shall be subject to EU control. However it permits Member States to adopt measures which could prohibit, submit to conditions or in any way prejudice such operations only if (i) the measures in question protect interests other than those taken into account by the EU Merger Regulation (public security, plurality of the media and prudential rules shall be regarded as legitimate interests, others can be recognized by the Commission after they are communicated by Member States) and (ii) these measures are necessary and proportionate for the protection of interests compatible with EU law and do not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction to the freedom of establishment or of the free movement of capital or, in any other respect, a breach of general principles or other provisions of Community law. 77 78 According to the EU Court of Justice, it would be impossible for the Government to assess the impact of the transaction on the security of supply when the authorization was to be given and, furthermore, it was always empowered to impose public service obligations on firms operating in the industry to guarantee the security of supply, see GAS NATURAL offering to provide assistance in raising the value of its original offer. GAS NATURAL refused to accept ENEL's help. Likewise the French energy company EDF and the Spanish construction and services company FCC also declared that they would consider contributing to GAS NATURAL's bid.
More telling was the decision of the local building and service company ACCIONA to buy 10% of ENDESA's shares for €3,388 million on September 2006 79 . This infrastructure and building company is controlled by the Entrecanales family, and it is heavily involved in large-scale civil works projects in Spain (lately it had also been increasingly interested in electricity generation from renewable energies, mainly wind-farms), but its annual sales turnover was less than one-tenth of E.ON. ACCIONA's acquisition was authorized by the NEC on November  3  rd 2006   80 Theoretically, the acquisition in the market of a relevant stake in the share capital of ENDESA was a diversification investment of ACCIONA, which did not aim at taking the control of ENDESA, but only to become a representative shareholder of the company, which considered it to be more valuable as an independent venture than in the hands of E.ON . Reacting to this any other potential challenges, E.ON simultaneously raised its bid by 38% to €35 per share, a 9% premium over the market price following E.ON entry. 81 . ACCIONA entered in the battle for the control of ENDESA acting as a "white squirrel", fighting against the behemoth of E.ON. ACCIONA's action was politically motivated by the Spanish government 82 Nonetheless, E.ON's way was cleared once the interim measures against GAS NATURAL bid (referred supra § §2.1.3 and 2.15) were lifted in January 2007. At that point the SSEC initiated the process of "closed envelope auction" of ENDESA, a procedure that applied in Spain at that time when more than one entity has disclosed an intention to make a tender offer for a Spanish issuer. However, two weeks later, on February 1 st 2007, GAS NATURAL's Board announced its unanimous decision to drop the bid for ENDESA , that was not only putting legal obstacles to confront E.ON's bid but also sought to introduce pressure in the market for a 'Spanish option' to succeed. (because it did not have any relevant incidence over ENDESA's strategic assets or regulated activities as long as control rights over the company was not acquired and not decisive influence could be carried over its management policy and decisions). 81 See the presentation "Endesa independent: an alternative with greater value", filed as a relevant fact before the SSEC by ACCIONA (on 25.01.2007, OC 22577), which clearly declared ENDESA to be worth more than the price offered by E.ON and described the conflicts and disadvantages if ENDESA became a subsidiary of E.ON. 82 The Spanish government would have supported ACCIONA's bid against the one launched by E.ON with the holdings the State still had in ENDESA (2.95%) coupled with the holdings held by LA CAIXA (an additional 2%). 83 See Relevant Fact 76189, filed before the SSEC by GAS NATURAL on 01.02.2007.
time, ACCIONA was ENDESA's largest shareholder, controlling 21% of its share capital, just below the threshold that would have triggered the duty to launch a rival tender offer (mainly because it lacked the means for an all-out rival bid). Paradoxically, being subject to Spanish takeover rules, therewith E.ON did not own a single share of ENDESA neither was it allowed to purchase any 84 .
THE END OF THE BATTLE: ENEL AND ACCIONA.
At the end of February the contest for the control of ENDESA took an unexpected turn. After several political contacts between the Spanish Government and the Italian Government 85
In the following weeks ENEL continued to purchase ENDESA's shares until it reached almost 25% of its share capital in mid-march 2007
, the Italian State Owned Enterprise (hereinafter SOE) ENEL acquired 9,99% of the share capital of ENDESA in the market at €39 per share (on Feb. 27 th , 2007) . ENEL presented this purchase as a way of benefitting from ENDESA's assets and operations in Italy, thereby strengthening its market position. , authorizing the acquisition given that there were no control rights over ENDESA but imposed several conditions as ENEL was able to exert a decisive influence over the regulated activities and strategic assets of ENDESA and because of the role and intervention of the Italian government in ENEL (with a dissenting opinion signed by three members of NEC's Board considering the transaction should have received the same treatment than the GAS NATURAL or the E.ON takeover bids, especially after the agreement between ACCIONA and ENEL of 26.03.2007 
LESSONS FROM THE ENDESA SAGA.
The battle for the control of ENDESA provides a rich legal minefield from which several lessons can be drawn. On the one hand, ENDESA's board was successful in levering the price finally paid for the company and the use it made available of competition and regulation tools provided by law was crucial and instrumental for that purpose (infra § 5.1). On the other hand, political manoeuvering by the Spanish Government played a determinative role on the outcome of the case, and although the option initially favoured by the Government was not successful, the government played a strong hand in sponsoring an alternative (infra §5.2). Overall, we can reflect generally on the relative relevance of competition and regulation issues for the case (infra §5.3) and the predominant role of politics, governmental interference and influence (infra §5.4).
Competition and Regulation as defensive tools against hostile takeovers.
From the beginning of the battle for the control of ENDESA, its board of directors was keen to consider any dimension other than the protection of the shareholders' interest in its assessment of the alternative bids. Although the integrity of ENDESA as a firm was mentioned at several stages, at the end it was clear that the best way to defend shareholders' interest was by getting a higher price. Undoubtedly, ENDESA's board was very successful in that task: from September 2005 to October 2007 its share price in the market increased approximately 120% (from €18.24 to €39.99, see table below). Indeed, the initial GAS NATURAL bid valued ENDESA in €22,549 million, the successful offer by ACCIONA/ENEL almost doubled that valuation (€42,519 million) 96 On the other hand, the battle for the control of ENDESA proves how national tender offer regulation may deter competing bids in takeover contests if supervisory authorities use their powers arbitrarily . On the other hand, ENDESA's board of directors failed in saving the integrity of ENDESA and keeping the company together as it was at the beginning of the process, given that as a result of the bid contest ENDESA was split up, part of which was given to E.ON with the remainder of the company being controlled by an Italian SOE (ENEL). The initial GAS NATURAL bid had a business rationale, and it was clear from the start that it was politically supported. The political support for GAS NATURAL faced strong opposition on both competition and regulation grounds, and it was also beaten in the market by a higher bidder (E.ON). At that moment, government intervention in the takeover contest became protectionist and sought a Spanish 'national champion' as the outcome of the battle.
The Spanish Government's support for the 'national champion' solution violated EU Law. Moreover, it was also trumped by the market as there was not financial leverage in a potential 'Spanish bid' to overcome E.ON's bid. That made the government give up the 'national champion idea (paradoxically, the final owner of ENDESA as a result of the contest is an Italian 
Competition and Regulation.
The battle for the control of ENDESA also provided some insights of the relationship between competition and regulation in the energy sector. According to Spanish Law, competition rules apply also in the energy industry, no matter there exists sectoral regulation.
However, application of competition law to the energy industry may be more difficult because of its specific features that may provide technical explanations to behavior being apparently anticompetitive. Firstly, competition authorities may face a high asymmetry of information in assessing market behavior in the energy industry. On competition grounds, the European Commission authorized, without conditions, the bids by E.ON and ACCIONA/ENEL, whereas the Spanish Government authorized, subject to conditions, the initial bid by GAS NATURAL.
. 103 On the other hand, regulatory measures in the energy sector have sought to create a competitive internal energy market in the EU. So far, there have been three regulatory packages The last one has been adopted in 2009 and it is aimed at strengthening sectoral energy authorities and providing a uniform regulatory framework across the EU (in force since 2011) 106 . EU regulation has strengthened the need for gas and electricity providers to unbundle vertically, leaving network operation under the control of a single entity in each country 107 Contrary to other Member States, in Spain vertical separation of operators of activities in competitive markets and of those which are regulated (natural monopoly) is effective, and there are independent companies operating the gas and electricity Transmission System Operators-TSOs (ENAGAS and RED ELÉCTRICA DE ESPAÑA/REE)
. The extent of liberalization has varied substantially among Member States. In some countries, like the UK and the Netherlands this has lead to fully liberalized and competitive markets, while in others -like Spain and France-greater concentration and fewer entrants have led to less competitive markets. Moreover, it can be argued that privatization is not a requisite for competition, but it has shown to be an important ingredient in the UK market. At the end, for a true competitive pan-European energy market to exist the regulatory regime adopted by the EU would need to face the issue of state ownership and control of energy companies, otherwise there would never be a fair and common level playing field across the EU.
enough to prevent problems arising in relation to the level of concentration in the industry, barriers to entry, the absence of cross-border interconnection and the lack of transparent information on market functioning 109 The European Commission has been active in enforcing the competition provisions of the TFEU in the energy industry 
Political interference and influence peddling in business decisions.
Aside from the legal features of the contest, the battle for the control of ENDESA will certainly be remembered for the significance of political intervention in the process. Firms taking part in the contest will clearly have learned how important it was to have not only the legal and economic arguments to support their bids, but also to have the government on their side (or, at least, not against them) 118 For those reasons, the battle for the control of ENDESA revealed the weaknesses of several domestic institutions, which were subject to continuous pressure and political influence. In contrast with the European Commission, the Spanish National Energy Commission, the Spanish Securities and Exchange Commission and also the Spanish Defense Competition Tribunal were used as tools of political power in the contest. As a result of the contest, the head of the Spanish Securities and Exchange Commission resigned in April 2007, claiming that the government's industrial policy was in conflict with market rules. Even the Spanish Supreme Court showed a remarkable division in deciding to award interim measures that stopped the takeover process.
. Instead of working as technical and independent institutions, on several occasions during the process, administrative authorities adopted decisions based on political reasons, their members siding with the political parties which had appointed them. Of course, that did not happen with judges and courts delivering opinions on different issues raised by the bid contest, although they were probably overwhelmed by the considerable implications of their decisions.
In short, the battle for the control of ENDESA is a good example of how the political and social implications of business transactions may overcome the legal and economic arguments in affecting the final outcome. The strength and maturity of the Spanish institutional framework was tested and questioned for its inadequate role in the transaction. It is doubtful that the public interest inspired government actions and decision-making during in the contest, nor could it be said that the government was focusing on enhancing competition or the consumers' interest. Apparently, it acted only on the basis of a fairly shortsighted and parochial idea of promoting the Spanish national champion solution.
granted by France to EDF that was incompatible state aid (requiring EDF to reimburse the unpaid tax of €889 million) and EUCJ judgment of 13.03.22001-Case C-379/98 PressenElektra AG and Schleswag AG [2001] ECR I-2159 (on environmental protection aid).
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
The ENDESA takeover contest provides a good illustration of many different issues that can be raised in transactions in which corporate control is at play. Spanish national law and EU law were relevant at several stages of the process. The initial hostile bid by GAS NATURAL prompted a staunch defensive reaction by ENDESA's board of directors that led to litigation on many fronts and different jurisdictions, involving competition, energy regulation, corporate law and securities regulation. The effectiveness of those defensive moves in delaying the battle for control of ENDESA was unquestionable. What was a purely domestic transaction became a major European cross-border contest when E.ON and ENEL launched their bids for ENDESA. The strong preference of the Spanish Government for a Spanish national champion to develop out of the ENDESA contest affected the whole process, and was a blatant violation of EU Law. This political interference with business decisions negatively influenced and affected the strength and reputation of several Spanish institutions and considerably delayed the process. Nevertheless, as a positive result out the takeover contest, investors almost doubled the value of their investments in ENDESA. At the end of the day, shareholders may indeed be one of the few stakeholders that benefitted from the transaction.
